Manufactured Scarcity - How International Law was used to Weaponise the Strait of Hormuz
Updated: 2 days ago
Introduction
The Strait of Hormuz was officially in crisis on 13th April 2026, as President Trump announced that US forces would be blockading the ever-critical Strait of Hormuz. An escalation from the ongoing war between the US-Israel and Iran, and now the entire world seems to be in flux, with the Strait alone carrying 25% of maritime oil trade, as well as critical amounts of crude oil, fertilizer, and food grain consignments, now to be rendered near impossible to cross for the unspecified foreseeable future.
The move comes in the wake of a short-lived ceasefire signed on the 8th of April, which aimed to facilitate the reopening of the strait in the first place. There are larger questions to be dealt with, particularly regarding whether this war constitutes an illegal war of aggression in the first place. Regardless, the situation at hand calls for a more detailed inspection, which ultimately exposes where the loyalties of today’s International Law truly lie.
Does International Law Justify the Blockade?
A blockade is, in essence, an act of war under international law, and the state that declares and enforces a blockade is the belligerent in such a war. As per the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, now largely accepted as customary law on maritime conflicts, a blockade must meet certain criteria to be legally valid. A blockade, once notified, must first be effective, and a “paper blockade” is as good as null. Secondly, such a blockade and its extent must be notified. Thirdly, the state notifying the blockade must be a belligerent state. Fourthly, it must be impartial, and finally, it must not block access to and from neutral ports.
It is interesting to note that The Commander’s handbook on the law of naval operations, published by the US navy directly endorses the above criterion, with respect to declaration, notification, effectivity and impartiality of blockades. In fact, the handbook notes US state practice, and declares that blockades continue, in the eyes of the US, to be useful means of regulating state practice. In contrast, Iran does not publish a naval manual of its own.
While the United States is clearly a belligerent, President Trump himself erred in declaring by declaring that the US Navy would be “blockading any ships trying to enter or leave the Strait of Hormuz”, a statement which was immediately rolled back by U.S. Central Command, which clarified that the US was intending to blockade ships entering and exiting Iranian Ports but had not begun doing so. Whether this confusion adequately satisfies the notice requirement is still unclear. While the US claims it shall be impartial and allow transit with respect to neutral ports, the key question at hand is effectiveness. The strait in itself is full of traffic, and a comprehensive blockade is no small task, even for the US Navy.
The US would argue that a blockade constitutes a necessary act of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter against Tehran's asymmetric disruption through Iranian maritime chokepoint mining and proxy attacks on commercial shipping. If such a justification for the blockade as an act of war were to satisfy the requirements of Jus Ad Bellum, it would sufficiently meet scholarly opinion today, which has largely refrained from applying Jus in Bello concerning blockades. In doing so, international law fails to assess the large-scale humanitarian disaster that is likely to ensue globally, as we shall further explore.
Large Scale Humanitarian Impact
As per the Erga Omnes obligations enshrined in the Barcelona Traction case, a distinction must clearly be drawn when the rights concerned are of specific importance to the international community, and hence, such rights may be enforced by any state – both as a right and as a duty.
Any blockade by nature has devastating repercussions on food and other essential supplies to the civilian population of the blockaded nation. We must keep in mind, however, that this is no ordinary blockade, as noted by the sheer scale and volume of goods transported across the Hormuz. The Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I of 1977, Art. 54 (1) categorically states that starvation of citizens as a method of warfare is prohibited in international law. Further, as per customary international law embodied in the San Remo Manual, a blockade is illegal if its effect on the civilian population is disproportionately large in relation to its perceived tactical or military effectiveness.
Whatever statements the US makes cannot be said to meet such a high threshold. Regardless of whether the civilian population of Iran is spared, a closed Strait of Hormuz is likely to trigger food crises at least in India and Brazil, not to forget countless other states, which are import-dependent on goods that are shipped through the Hormuz and are now desperately scrambling for urgent supplies. It is clear in the present instance, that the above violations risk endangering Erga Omnes rights held by the entire international community.
Coloniality of naval blockades
An analysis of state practice that led to the development of the modern-day law of blockade in itself indicates the power structure at hand in the present conflict. Originating in the 16th century, blockades themselves were enforced by seafaring states, which at the time were far and few between. At this stage, these maritime powers dominated state practice and hence moulded the law to suit imperial interests, enforcing blockades to help their navies establish overseas colonies.
An instance which comes to mind is the British Blockade of Argentine forces in 1982, during the Falklands War. While technically legal under the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which was the prevailing instrument at the time, the same resulted in over 400 Argentine lives, an act that was unanimously condemned. Such an instance is illustrative of the technique employed to crush native forces, such as in the British blockade of the French in 1752, which led to the capture of the French colony of Louisburg.
What is remarkable is that being a belligerent state and a neutral seafaring state in such a circumstance was a two-way street. These states recognised that their mutual acceptance of one another’s blockades would eventually benefit the other, when they happened to be the blockading state and the other the neutral. Hence, neutral states typically accepted such strong-arming in light of trade and politics.
The authors strongly advocate against neutral acceptance of the blockade in the present circumstance, especially by states from the global south. As history indicates, neutral acceptance of a blockade is nothing more than a submission to the strong-arming tactics that underlie such an act of war, thereby replicating the very state practice that allowed it to be fortified as international law in the first place.
Is Iran Without Fault?
Another interesting question is Iran’s contribution to this crisis. Before the blockade, there was a near-unanimous condemnation of Iran’s regulation of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz and its charging of transit fees. The UNSC adopted Resolution 2817 (2026), condemning Iran’s actions in the Hormuz as well as attacks on Oman, Bahrain, and other states, not considered to be belligerents to this present war.
As present reporting indicates, Iran attempted to mine the Strait of Hormuz, which it subsequently lost control of. In essence, the strait is to remain shut regardless, until these mines can be tracked and cleared. Under the 1907 Hague VIII Convention, as well as the portion of the Nicaragua case of the ICJ dealing with the US’ mining, a state laying mines must comply with certain conditions to meet the legality requirement. Firstly, states laying unanchored mines in an international waterway must ensure they become harmless one hour post loss of control, which is clearly impossible in this instance. Secondly, there must be notice of hazardous zones when mines are laid. Tehran, instead, has threatened to sink vessels that enter such a hazardous zone. This can hardly be said to qualify the notice requirement. Finally, all such mines need to be tracked, and Iran has lost track of the mines, which is a violation of the entire regime.
The Strait of Hormuz is not an international water or high seas but rather an “international strait”: the summation of the territorial sea of two states – Oman and Iran. Iran, however, is not a signatory to the UNCLOS, Article 44 of which provides that states bordering straits cannot suspend the right of “transit passage”. Whether or not such a rule constitutes customary international law is debatable, but regardless, Iran would qualify as a persistent objector and would not remain bound by such a custom.
A stronger criticism could be that Iran violates the regime of “innocent passage”, as established by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, which is an older, more powerful customary regime. While Iran may contend that its regulation of transit through the Hormuz is merely a security measure, it is clear from our discussion on its uncontrolled mining that such a situation is nothing but Iran’s own doing.
Hence, we cannot ignore the irresponsible complicity on the part of Iran in effectively choking the Strait of Hormuz.
Conclusion
The analysis above shows that the legal tensions around the U.S. Actions in the Strait of Hormuz reveal a deep contradiction inside modern international law. On one side U.S. Military practice as shown in The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations clearly follows rules about declaration, notification, effectiveness and keeping neutral ports free rules written into the 1994 San Remo Manual. On the side using these old naval rules on a vital global chokepoint that carries 25 percent of worldwide maritime oil trade clashes with current rules. Specifically Rule 102 of the San Remo Manual and Article 54(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions forbid any blockade that causes economic harm or hunger that is too large compared to the military benefit.
Because blocking the Strait creates shortages of supplies and food for countries that are not, at war and rely on imports that action breaches the broad duties the global community owes to one another. In the end this crisis shows that modern naval warfare law still carries the weight of imperial ideas, protecting the power tactics of the great sea nations while leaving international law powerless to stop worldwide humanitarian and economic damage.
And there we have it, just two states were able to choke the world’s most crucial strait, a crisis whose resolution won’t come easily to the world. As the authors hinted at earlier, international law has failed to introspect upon itself in the modern day. If state practice intended to allow a handful of nations to subsume the world centuries ago, is what forms the backbone of the law relevant today, the results reasonably reproduce the same system of coloniality that the world cannot afford to remain stuck in.
Neutrality thus can no longer remain an option for the parts of the world most affected, especially the global south. A principled push back against imperial aspirations, which commenced such a war in the first place, is the only way forward.
Authors
SNIGDHA REDDY J
Bio - Snigdha Reddy J is a third-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at the School of Law, CHRIST
(Deemed to be University), Bangalore. She is deeply passionate about Public International law
and dispute resolution, with research interests centered on International Commercial
Arbitration and Litigation.
PRANAV BHAT
Bio - Pranav Bhat is a third-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at the School of Law, CHRIST
(Deemed to be University), Bangalore. Pranav is passionate about Public International law,
particularly Maritime law and International Human Rights law.
